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Abstract: The paper focuses on the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, 
specifically government expenditure on output in Bulgaria. The main finding of the study 
is that the size of the fiscal impulse is the most important determinant of the non-
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automatically assure growth; the regulations regarding the budgetary categories 
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Introduction
A large part of recent empirical studies in the area of public finance has been 
exploring the short-run expansionary influence of fiscal consolidations on 
macroeconomic aggregates, mainly private consumption and output. In the economic 
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2literature these effects have been called “non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy”. The 
papers discuss mainly the experience of developed European economies; few studies 
investigate the post-communist countries. 
This study focuses on the Bulgarian experience between 1998 and 2004, a few 
years prior to the EU accession. It tries to illuminate the macroeconomic impact of the 
discretionary fiscal interventions. The analysis shows a presence of non-Keynesian 
influence of government outlays on output and looks at factors that determine it. The tax 
policy affects short-run real growth in the typical Keynesian manner. The non-linearity in 
the effects of budgetary categories implies that the balanced-budget policy accompanied 
by growing government’s size could decelerate the short-run real growth. So, it is not 
enough to focus on the budgetary result; the regulations regarding the budgetary 
categories themselves should also be considered. 
Section 1 of the paper presents the theoretical background as well as empirical 
research on non-Keynesian effects of government expenditure on output. Section 2 
outlines the method for cyclical adjustment of fiscal categories. Section 3 describes the 
empirical model (Logit) and its results. The main findings of the study and its practical 
implications are presented in Section 4.
Non-Keynesian effects of government expenditure: theoretical background and 
empirical results
3In contrast with the traditional Keynesian view, the studies on non-Keynesian 
effects indicate that tight fiscal policy can stimulate economic activity in the short run. 
Besides the expansionary role of fiscal restrictions (so called “expansionary fiscal 
consolidations”), the relevant studies consider the role of the budget adjustments in 
reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio or the fiscal deficits-to-GDP ratio several years after the 
adjustment. Such consolidation efforts are defined as “successful fiscal adjustments” (see, 
for example, Afonso 2001). 
Most papers point out that non-Keynesian response of output is more likely in the 
case of a spending cut than a tax increase. This section outlines the theoretical foundation 
as well as the empirical findings about non-Keynesian effects, focusing specifically on 
the impact of budgetary spending on output.   
Several theoretical explanations of the non-Keynesian effects of government 
expenditure can be found in the literature (see, for example, Alesina and Ardagna 1998, 
Alesina and Perotti 1996, Ardagna 2004, Giavazzi and Pagano 1995, Perotti 1999, 
Sutherland 1997). 
Fiscal policy affects output either through demand-side channel or through 
supply-side channel. One of the explanations of the non-Keynesian effects on the 
demand-side is based on the wealth effect on consumption. Restrictive fiscal policy 
triggers expectations for a future tax cut and a higher present value of household income, 
which stimulates private consumption and thus output. Oppose to the traditional view, the 
wealth effect entails an increase in consumption as a result of an expenditure cut. This 
explanation represents the “expectation view of the fiscal policy”. 
4The effect is stronger when the fiscal policy changes are perceived as permanent. 
As well, the presence of the positive wealth effect might depend on the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. Economic agents expect that when this ratio reaches a certain high level, an upward 
jump in taxation will occur. If a fiscal restriction is undertaken before this expected level 
of debt-to-GDP ratio, the probability for a tax increase is lower. These positive 
expectations generate, in turn, a positive wealth effect on the household consumption.
Blanchard (1990) points out that a tax increase can also have an expansionary 
effect on output if it generates expectations of less dramatic tax increases tomorrow. It 
may also reduce precautionary savings by lowering the uncertainty about the course of 
future fiscal policy.  
Additionally, the wealth effect could arise from the fall in interest rates, following 
the fiscal consolidation. In this case, the market value of the households’ wealth increases 
which can lead to higher consumption spending and, in turn, output.
The second source of expansionary fiscal contractions is the credibility effect on 
interest rates. This effect works when the ratio debt/GDP is high, that is during periods of 
fiscal stress. At high levels of public debt, investors may face an interest rate premium 
due to the default risks or inflation. The fiscal consolidation can bring a downward 
pressure on the interest rates by reducing the risk premium, which will crowd in private 
investments. 
In addition, there is a supply-side channel at work. According to the labor market 
view, cuts in government employment or transfer payments boost employment in the 
private sector and stimulate the economy. Also, higher/lower wages in the government 
sector put an upward/downward pressure on the business sector wages and 
5increase/decrease unit labor costs. This is equivalent to a negative/positive supply shock 
leading to a contraction/expansion of output. In open economies with a flexible 
exchange-rate regime, reduced labor costs, resulting from a fiscal restriction, increase the 
competitiveness of the companies and raise the net export. 
The labor market channel operates in both competitive and unionized labor 
markets although in a different manner. An increase in the public employment or 
government wages in the competitive labor markets leads to a fall in private sector 
employment. As was noted earlier, this results in an increase of the real wage and a 
decline in profits, investments, and thus output, in the business sector. 
With unionized labor markets, an increase of public employment, wages of public 
sector employees or unemployment benefits raises unions’ wage claims in the private 
sector, boosts the wages and reduces profits and investments (Ardagna 2007).  The final 
result is the same – a negative relationship between government spending, specifically its 
wage component, and short-run GDP growth. 
The empirical studies confirm that the presence of non-Keynesian effects depends 
on a number of factors such as initial conditions and the fiscal impulse’s characteristics2.  
The key findings of these studies are summarized bellow. 
The composition of the fiscal impulse is one of the factors, which determine the 
outcome of the fiscal intervention. Restrictions on government wages and transfers are 
more successful in stimulating economic activity in the short-run than a tax increase or a 
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6capital spending cut. This result is consistent with the abovementioned labor market 
view. 
According to Perotti (1996), the adjustments of social expenditure and wage 
government consumption are more persistent and are associated with rising rates of 
growth and investments than the labor-tax increases or the capital spending cuts. The 
reason is that bigger and persistent fiscal adjustments point to the government’s
commitment to a longer lasting change of the fiscal regime and, in consequence, are more 
likely to expand private demand and output.  
Bigger and persistent adjustments, inducing a permanent change in the fiscal 
regime, are more likely to expand private demand and thus output (Giavazzi and Pagano 
1995, McDermott and Wescott 1996).
Perotti (1999) finds that the European economies in which fiscal adjustments 
occur have extremely high debt-to-GDP levels or rates of debt accumulation. In such 
periods, a negative shock to government purchases stimulates consumption and output. 
Conversely, when the fiscal situation in the country is sound, the traditional Keynesian 
effects dominate. The share of liquidity constrained consumers in the economy is also 
important: the higher the share, the lower the probability for a non-Keynesian outcome.     
The effect of public outlays on consumption may depend on the initial 
government consumption-to-output ratio (Bertola and Drazen 1993). When that ratio 
approaches a “trigger” value, households expect a further expenditure cut, designed to 
ensure the sustainability of public finances. The present value of their net income, and 
hence consumption, grows. If the cut does not materialize, consumption falls 
significantly. When government spending continues to rise above the “trigger value”, 
7agents anticipate a tax cut in the near future and boost their consumption. At the moment 
of fiscal stabilization, government expenditure falls significantly while private 
consumption is at a high level. 
Alesina et al (2002) find a strong negative impact of government expenditure on 
profit and investments in the private sector. Government wages have the largest negative 
effect on profit, bigger than that of taxes. The study demonstrates the positive impact of 
government wage spending and labor taxes on labor costs. This evidence is consistent 
with the labor market view discussed above. 
Also, the authors show that changes in business investments explain to a great 
extent the expansionary effect of large fiscal stabilizations in developed economies: prior 
to the expansionary fiscal adjustment, the growth rate of business investments is negative 
and contributes negatively to the GDP growth, the latter in this case being small. During 
and after the adjustment, the growth of private investments is positive and significantly 
contributes to the high GDP growth. This pattern cannot be observed when fiscal 
consolidations affect output in the Keynesian (negative) manner.     
The studies underline the importance of accompanying policies. Monetary 
stabilizations, falls in the real interest rates and currency devaluations play a significant 
role for the expansionary fiscal consolidations in Denmark (1983-1986) and Ireland 
(1987-1989) (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990). 
On the other hand, McDermott and Wescott (1996) consider the case of an 
unsuccessful fiscal adjustment in the UK. Despite the consolidation efforts the ratio of 
public debt to GDP increased by 7 percentage points between 1980 and 1984. This 
outcome reflected the domestic contractionary monetary policy, which resulted in a sharp 
8appreciation of the national currency. Also, the consolidation was attempted during a 
world economic recession and very high interest rates. Third, fiscal policy mix was not 
favorable: net capital outlays were reduced while social security benefits rose. 
It should be noted that other authors express a different view about the role of 
monetary policy for the appearance of non-Keynesian effects. For example, Ardagna 
(2004) shows that successful and expansionary fiscal contractions are not the result of 
expansionary monetary policy or exchange rate devaluations.  Hemming et al (2002) 
point out that alternative monetary regimes have relatively little effect on the size of 
short-term fiscal multipliers.
By contrast, few studies examine the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy in 
acceding countries (see Table 1).  
Purfield (2003) explores large fiscal adjustments in a number of transition 
economies, including Bulgaria, between 1992 and 2000. The study analyzes the 
countries’ overall primary balances, rather than the cyclically adjusted ones, as a measure 
of the fiscal stance. The large and expenditure-based fiscal adjustments are more 
successful in sustainable improvements in the primary balance within two years after the 
adjustment. The author does not find episodes of expansionary fiscal consolidations in 
transition economies. Bulgaria is given as an example of successful fiscal contraction in 
1994.
Siwinska and Bujak (2003) focus on the consumption effects of fiscal policy for a 
panel of 14 transition countries between 1990 and 2001 (Bulgaria included). Not 
cyclically adjusted budget balances of consolidated central governments serve as a 
measure of the fiscal stance. The consumption reacts in a non-linear fashion to the 
9discretionary budgetary interventions. The households tend to behave in a Keynesian 
manner when the level of the fiscal deficit is small (within the limits of the mean value 
plus one standard deviation, calculated for the time period). In “bad times”, fiscal 
expansions stimulate private consumption but on a much smaller degree than in “good 
times”. In general, the non-Keynesian response of consumption during the periods of 
fiscal stress does not outweigh the Keynesian effects, observed during normal times. The 
authors explain this outcome by the bigger portion of liquidity-constrained and myopic 
consumers in transition countries.
Von Hagen (2004) surveys the fiscal episodes in the New Member States between 
1999 and 2002 on the basis of the cyclically adjusted general government budget deficits. 
The author uses “the growth-accounting approach” to calculate the discretionary fiscal 
impulse. The budget deficit is corrected with the rate of real GDP growth in order to 
isolate the exogenous from endogenous changes in the fiscal stance. This method for 
cyclical adjustment is used by Afonso et al (2005) as well as Rzonca and Cizkowicz 
(2006). Large expenditure-based budgetary expansions dominate; only five large fiscal 
consolidations have been observed, all of them in the Baltic States.  
Afonso et al (2005) study fiscal consolidations in the eight New Member States, 
Bulgaria and Romania over the period 1991-2003. They focus on the substantial
improvements in the structural budget balances. A Logit model helps to assess the 
determinants of the successful fiscal adjustments. The results confirm that, similar to the 
advanced European economies, the expenditure-based adjustments tend to be more 
successful in reducing the general government budget deficits for two consecutive years 
than the revenue based ones. Three examples of successful fiscal contractions are given 
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for Bulgaria (1992, 1994 and 1997) and one example of an unsuccessful consolidation 
(1998). According to the authors, expenditure-based consolidations prevail due to the 
limited administrative capacity of post-communist countries to increase tax revenues and, 
in comparison with advanced EU economies, start out from higher overall deficit levels 
when fiscal stabilization seems “inevitable”. 
On the basis of data for the New Member States from CEE (NMS) between 1993 
and 2002, Rzonca and Cizkowicz (2005) find evidence that fiscal adjustments accelerate 
short-run output growth. The study identifies only the export channel as a source of non-
Keynesian effects.  The descriptive analysis shows that an important determinant of these 
effects is the size of the fiscal impulse. Large fiscal consolidations are almost always 
accompanied by higher rates of output growth. In support of the relevant studies 
mentioned above, the study confirms that fiscal consolidations in the NMS are achieved 
mainly through expenditure cuts.  
This study concentrates on factors, which determine the presence of non-
Keynesian response of output to a discretionary fiscal shock in Bulgaria. It focuses on the 
effects of government expenditure specifically while the earlier studies did not 
differentiate the macroeconomic impact of the budgetary categories. Also, the 
discretionary expenditure changes isolated by the HP filter serve as a measure of the 
fiscal stance.  
Table 1. Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy in post-communist economics: a review of empirical studies.
Author Purpose of the 
study
Method  of the 
study
Sample Measure of fiscal 
stance(% GDP)
Main conclusions
Purfield 
(2003)
Determinants of 
successful fiscal 
consolidations
Probit  model
Descriptive 
analysis
Twenty-five 
transition economies, 
(1992-2000)
General government 
primary budget balance
Larger expenditure-based fiscal adjustments are more successful 
in budget deficit reduction in two years after the consolidation.
Siwinska and 
Bujak (2003)
Fiscal policy’s 
impact on 
household 
consumption
Time series 
regression
Fifteen transition 
economies, (1990-
2001)
Consolidated government 
budget balance
Non-linear behavior of household consumption; in times of 
fiscal stress (high levels of fiscal deficit) fiscal expansions 
stimulate private consumption but in a lower degree than in 
good fiscal times (low fiscal deficits); in general, Keynesian 
response prevails.
Von Hagen
(2004)
Composition of 
fiscal 
interventions
Descriptive 
analysis
NMS from CEE,
(1999-2002)
Cyclically adjusted 
budget balance
(growth – accounting 
approach)
Fiscal expansions prevail over fiscal consolidations; in most 
cases large fiscal expansions were expenditure dominated; all 
“good quality” fiscal consolidations were in the Baltic states .
Afonso et all 
(2005)
Determinants of 
successful fiscal 
consolidations
Logit model
Descriptive 
analysis
NMS, (1991-2003) Cyclically adjusted 
primary budget balance
(growth-accounting 
approach)
Fiscal consolidations based on expenditure cuts are more 
successful than revenue increases in reducing budget deficit 
within two years after the adjustment; fiscal adjustments based 
on reduction of budget spending prevail.
Rzonca, A., P. 
Cizkowicz 
(2006)
Fiscal policy’s 
impact on GDP 
growth
Time-series 
regressions
Descriptive 
analysis
NMS from CEE
(1993-2002).
Cyclically adjusted 
primary budget balance
(growth-accounting 
approach)
Discretionary fiscal adjustments accelerate real GDP growth in 
the short-run; in most cases, strong fiscal consolidations have an 
expansionary effect on output; fiscal consolidations are based 
primarily on the expenditure cuts, specifically cuts in wage 
outlays.
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The methodology of the study: constructing the discretionary fiscal impulse
The HP filter3 is used for the cyclical adjustment of budgetary categories -
primary government expenditure and tax revenues. This method has been chosen among 
a number of alternatives4 because of its popularity, transparency and suitability for 
international comparisons.  
Quarterly data for the primary government spending and for the total tax revenue 
of the general government budget and for GDP over the period 1998-2004 form the basis 
of the analysis. The data are first deflated by the GDP deflator (1995=100) and seasonally 
adjusted. The primary government spending includes wages and social insurance 
payments, subsidies, expenditure on goods and services, social expenditure and capital 
outlays5.
To isolate the endogenous changes from the exogenous (discretionary) 
movements of the budgetary categories the HP filter with λ=4806 is applied to the 
                                                
3 Hodrick and Prescott (1997).
4 Another popular method for cyclical adjustment is the elasticity method, used by international 
organizations (Giorno et al 1995, Rőger and Ongena 1998). Blanchard (1993) proposes to estimate the 
discretionary shock as the difference between the actual policy and the policy that would prevail under the 
previous year’s growth rate. See also, Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Jonnson 
(2004).
5 Source: Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.government.bg
6 The coefficient λ=480 for quarterly data corresponds to a value λ=30 for annual data according to the 
formula λannual =  λquarterly * (0.25)2 (Ravn and Uhlig 2002). The value of 30 is used in the studies of the ECB 
(Bouthevillain et al 2001).The lower the value of the weighting parameter the better the discretionary 
policy shocks are captured. 
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seasonally adjusted quarterly series for the total primary government spending (G) and 
the total tax revenue (T). The structural (cyclically adjusted) series are expressed as a 
share of real GDP and denoted by g and t respectively.  
The discretionary expenditure impulse GIt is defined as the difference between the 
cyclically adjusted values of primary government outlays in a given period and in a 
previous period:                        
GIt = g t – gt-1, = ∆ g     (1),
where g is defined as above. A positive/negative value of GI indicates an 
expansionary/contractionary fiscal impulse. 
Figure 1. Discretionary expenditure policy and real GDP growth
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               Source: author’s calculations on the basis of data from Ministry of Finance and 
            National Statistical Institute.
Figure 1 gives evidence of a negative relationship between the discretionary 
expenditure changes and the real GDP growth on impact, which implies a presence of 
14
non-Keynesian influence of government expenditure. In addition, the correlation between 
GI and real GDP growth is strong and negative (correlation coefficient of -0.91). As can 
be seen from the graph, the restrictive fiscal impulse is always accompanied by a positive 
rate of growth. Such a negative relationship is not valid for all cases of a positive 
spending shock, but it is clear that larger fiscal expansions are accompanied by negative 
rates of GDP growth.   
Figure 2. Discretionary tax policy and real GDP growth
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        Source: author’s calculations on the basis of data from Ministry of Finance and 
        National Statistical Institute.
The descriptive analysis also demonstrates a Keynesian behavior of tax policy 
(figure 2). The lower average tax burden in the economy leads to positive rates of output 
growth. So, the fiscal categories influence economic activity in a non-linear fashion: 
while a typical Keynesian result prevails for the tax payments, a non-Keynesian outcome 
has been observed for the government outlays.     
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Figure 3. Changes in the expenditure impulse and changes in the rate of real 
GDP growth 
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Source: author’s calculations on the basis of data from Ministry of finance and 
National Statistical Institute.
The negative relationship between the annual changes in the discretionary fiscal 
impulse (changes in the rate of growth of cyclically adjusted public spending) and the 
changes in the rate of real year-to-year GDP growth confirms the existence of non-
Keynesian effects in Bulgaria (fig. 3). When government spending was growing at slower 
pace, the short-run output growth accelerated. This pattern is clearly seen in 2000, 2002 
and 2004. In 2003, the faster increase in government spending was accompanied by a 
lower rate of real GDP growth than in the previous year.   
However, the descriptive analysis demonstrates that the non-Keynesian result has 
not been observed in all times; in several cases the discretionary expansions have been 
accompanied by a positive rate of GDP growth. Also, in 2001 the lower share of 
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government purchases in output did not lead to a faster real economic growth (fig. 3). 
Next, the study should answer the question: What are the determinants of non-Keynesian 
effects of government expenditure on aggregate output in Bulgaria?.
Determinants of non-Keynesian effects of government expenditure: a Logit model 
An appropriate instrument for evaluating the determinants of non-Keynesian 
effects is the Logit regression. The Logit model is of the following form:
z
z
e
e
ZyEP  1)1(
y is a binary variable reflecting the influence of the discretionary expenditure 
impulse on output. It takes the following values:
y = 1 in the case of a non-Keynesian influence of government expenditure on 
output (the discretionary fiscal impulse (Δg) and the real GDP growth (ygrowth) are 
moving inversely): an economic downturn/upturn is observed when the cyclically 
adjusted budgetary outlays increase/decrease;
y = 0 in the case of a traditional Keynesian impact of government spending on 
short-run economic activity (Δg and ygrowth are moving in the same direction): the positive 
interventions on government spending are accompanied by a positive rate of real GDP 
growth.
E (y=1│Z) is the conditional probability for a presence of a non-Keynesian effect 
of the discretionary fiscal impulse, given z, where 
Z = a + b x + e      
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The choice of the factor variables (x) depends on the relevant theoretical and 
empirical findings as well as on the descriptive analysis above. According to the previous 
studies, the main determinants of the non-Keynesian effects are the size of the fiscal 
impulse and the level of ratio government debt/GDP. Also, as was pointed out, fiscal 
restrictions are more likely than fiscal expansions to demonstrate a non-Keynesian impact 
on output. Each of these factors is tested as a possible determinant of the non-Keynesian 
effects through a Logit model. 
In light of this, the independent variables (x) are respectively:
 TYPEIMPU, denoting the type of the discretionary impulse
    TYPEIMPU =      1 for an expansionary fiscal impulse (Δg >0)
                               0 for a restrictive fiscal impulse (Δg < 0)
The inclusion of this variable in the model would show whether the non-
Keynesian effects of government expenditure on output would prevail in the case of a 
tight expenditure policy or in the case of an accommodating expenditure policy. Most of 
the studies explore the output effects of fiscal consolidations.
 SIZEIMPU, presenting the size of the discretionary fiscal impulse (Δg)
         
 SIZEIMPU =      1 for significant expenditure impulses
                       0 for neutral (insignificant) expenditure impulses
18
The fiscal intervention is defined as “significant” if the discretionary expenditure 
impulse (GI= Δg) in a given period lies outside the interval of the mean value (µg) 
plus/minus one half standard deviation (σg).  Otherwise, the fiscal intervention is 
insignificant and is defined as “neutral”.
Table 2 presents the values of the binary variable SIZEIMPU according to the size 
of the expenditure impulse (GI); the frequency distribution is displayed on figure 4. 
Table 2. Values of  SIZEIMPU
Size of the discretionary 
fiscal impulse
Type of the discretionary fiscal 
impulse
Value of
SIZEIMPU
-∞ < ∆g < -0.07
-∞ < ∆g < µg - ½ σg
Significant 
(Restrictive)
1
-0.07 < ∆g < 0
µg - ½ σg < ∆g < 0
Neutral 0
0 < ∆g < 0.47
0 < ∆g < µg + ½ σg
Neutral 0
0.47 < ∆g < ∞
µg + ½ σg < ∆g < ∞
Significant
(Expansionary)
1
µg is the sample average of FI (Δg), σg is the standard deviation. The discretionary 
expenditure impulse is regarded as neutral (SIZEIMPU=0) if its value is between (µg - ½ 
σg) and (µg + ½ σg). The fiscal impulse is defined as significant (SIZEIMPU=1) if it lies 
outside the interval (µg - ½ σg; µg + ½ σg) .
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Figure 4. Frequency distribution of the discretionary expenditure impulse (Δg) 
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The discretionary expenditure impulse (GI) is defined as expansionary if its value 
is greater than 0.47% of GDP (0.47 = µg + ½ σg). The expenditure intervention is 
restrictive if GI is negative and smaller than -0.07% of GDP (0.07 = µg - ½ σg). If the 
value of the fiscal impulse is between -0.07 and 0.47, the fiscal stance is defined as 
neutral.  
Respectively, SIZEIMPU is 0 when –0.07 < Δg < 0.47, i.e. when the primary 
government spending has changed between –0.07% and 0.5% of GDP. If the fiscal 
intervention is outside these limits, it is regarded as significant and SIZEIMPU equals 1. 
In this way the hypothesis that the size of the discretionary impulse is an important factor 
for the appearance of the non-Keynesian effects would be verified. The relevant literature 
concludes that the larger the fiscal impulse, the greater the probability for the non-
Keynesian outcome.
20
 The GOVDEBT variable reflects the role of the initial conditions, 
specifically the level of government debt. According to the theoretical explanations, a 
non-Keynesian result is more probable when the debt-to-GDP ratio is high. In such times 
(times of “fiscal stress”), economic agents appreciate the authorities’ efforts to improve 
the sustainability of the public finances through a fiscal consolidation, which stimulates 
private demand and output. GOVDEBT is a nominal variable equal to the government 
debt/GDP ratio. 
 The next exogenous variable SIZET included in the model reflects the size 
of the discretionary tax changes. It is introduced in order to test the relationship between 
the tax policy and the non-Keynesian response of output to the expenditure policy. SIZET 
is a binary variable, similar in nature and definition to the variable SIZEIMPU. Its value 
is based on the value of the discretionary tax revenue impulse (TIt) defined as the 
difference between the cyclically adjusted tax revenue in a given period and in a previous 
period (see, expression (1)).                        
TIt = t t – tt-1, = ∆ t          (2),
where t is the HP filtered tax revenue expressed as a share of GDP. SIZET is equal to 1 
when ∆ t lies outside the interval of the mean value (µt) and one half standard deviation 
(σt). 
                 SIZET=      0, if -0.14 < Δt < 0.30  
                                    1, otherwise
A positive value for SIZET would mean that the non-Keynesian influence of 
government outlays on output is more probable in the case of higher discretionary tax 
changes. 
21
The results of regression analysis are presented in Table 3. 
Тable 3. Determinants of non-Keynesian effects: econometric results
SIZEIMPU TYPEIMPU SIZET GOVDEBT
b 5.05
(1.47)*
10.05
(37.66)
1.49
(0.85)
-0.03
(0.03)
Wald statistics 11.80 0.07 3.07 1.06
p-value for b 0.00 0.79 0.08 0.30
Exp.(b) 155.96 23156 4.44 0.96
pseudo R2 0.768 0.51 0.16 0.05
* st. error of the estimate
As can be seen, two of the exogenous variables have statistically significant 
regression coefficients: SIZEIMPU and SIZET. The type of the discretionary impulse 
(TYPEIMPU) is not among factors influencing the appearance of the non-Keynesian 
effects, since the last are observed during both fiscal expansions and fiscal contractions. 
In addition, the level of government debt does not determine the non-Keynesian behavior 
of output. Such a conclusion is not unreasonable in the light of the fact that non-
Keynesian effects in the Bulgarian economy appear as a result of budget consolidations 
as well as budgetary expansions. 
The size of the fiscal interventions is a statistically significant determinant of the 
non-Keynesian effects. Similar to the results of the relevant studies the larger the changes 
in the cyclically adjusted expenditure, the higher the probability for non-Keynesian 
effects. 
        If the value of the discretionary expenditure impulse is outside the limits of the mean 
value plus/minus one half standard deviation, the probability for a non-Keynesian 
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outcome is approximately 0.9 (fig.5). By contrast, small changes in the expenditure 
policy result in traditional Keynesian behavior of aggregate activity in the short run. This 
implies that larger expenditure cuts could more successfully stimulate the aggregate 
activity in the Bulgarian economy.     
The regression coefficient for the variable SIZET is also statistically significant. If 
the variable SIZET lies outside the interval (µt - ½*σt; µt + ½*σt), the probability of a 
non-Keynesian response is near 0.6. 
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Figure 5 plots the probability for a non-Keynesian response of output to the 
discretionary expenditure shock as a function of the size of the expenditure impulse as 
well as of the size of the tax revenue impulse in the same period. It implies that the 
probability for a non-Keynesian result is higher when both the size of the expenditure 
intervention and the size of the tax intervention are higher. 
Larger increases in the tax revenue-GDP ratios have been accompanied by non-
Keynesian effects of budgetary purchases on output. This outcome is due to the fact that 
under the Currency Board Arrangement, introduced on 1st July 1997, the Bulgarian 
authorities keep a budget close to balance or in surplus. Both spending and taxes are 
moving in an upward direction: in order to keep the government’s budget constraint, 
higher spending requires a higher tax burden. 
The size of government in Bulgaria, expressed by the average of government 
spending-to-GDP ratio and revenue-to-GDP ratio, is continuously growing during the 
investigated period. In 2004, it is above the NMS8 average and equals to 41% of GDP, 
while NMS8 average is 40.2%7. In addition, only Slovenia and Hungary have a higher 
revenue-to-GDP ratio. At the same time, Bulgaria has the lowest GDP per capita, far 
below the NMS8 average (30.6 for Bulgaria and 56.5 for NMS8, EU25=100). The two 
countries with a similar monetary regime – Estonia and Lithuania – have a smaller 
government’s size: 36.5% and 32.5% of GDP respectively. Between 1998 and 2005, 
primary government spending in Bulgaria has increased from 32.1% to 38.1% of GDP. 
Tax revenue accounted for 30.9% of GDP in 1998 and 34.5% of GDP in 2004, while for 
                                                
7
Data are taken from the EUROSTAT database and the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance. NMS8 include 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.    
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the same period total revenue was growing from 38% of GDP to 42.9% of GDP. These 
figures show that the positive budget balance in the Bulgarian economy under the 
Currency Board Arrangement is a result of a restrictive tax policy rather than of an 
expenditure consolidation.  
The results imply that the balanced-budget policy in countries with a large public 
sector could have a negative impact on macroeconomic activity. So, the imposition of 
fiscal rules on the overall budget balance only is not enough with a view of accelerating 
growth prospects. According to the Stability and Growth Pact, the Eurozone countries 
should keep a budget balance-to-GDP ratio below 3% and a debt-to-GDP ratio below 
60%.  The Pact does not specify rules about the level of current government spending, 
public investment or tax burden. It is important to evaluate how the country meets the 
budget balance, by raising taxes and spending or by lowering both, because the 
expenditure expansion accompanied by tight tax policy is likely to impede the real short-
run growth. 
The study could not unambiguously identify the channels through which non-
Keynesian effects of government purchases operate. The results show the importance of 
the net export channel. During the whole period under observation except 2002 both the 
share of government purchases in GDP and the share of import in GDP were growing. 
The correlation between changes in the cyclically adjusted government spending-GDP 
ratio and changes in the net export-GDP ratio is large and negative (-0.84). Due to the 
Currency Board Arrangement, the cumulative inflation in the medium run leads to a real 
exchange rate appreciation thus making imported goods relatively cheaper. In this case, it 
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is reasonable to expect that higher government purchases, especially government 
consumption spending, will stimulate import and will lead to a lower real GDP growth. 
The descriptive analysis does not give evidence for the existence of either a 
consumption channel or an investment channel. Expenditure impulse is positively 
correlated with both changes in the private consumption-to-GDP ratio (0.7) and changes 
in the business investments-to-GDP ratio (0.4).    
Conclusion
This study illuminates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in Bulgaria 
during the pre-accession period. The descriptive analysis shows a negative relationship 
between the discretionary expenditure interventions and short-run output growth. The tax 
policy affects output in the traditional Keynesian manner.  
The size of the discretionary impulse is the main determinant of the non-
Keynesian effects of government outlays: the stronger fiscal expansions/contractions are 
more likely to decelerate/accelerate GDP growth.  This result supports the conclusions of 
relevant research on both advanced and post-communist economies.
The study emphasizes on the relationship between the tax policy conducted by the 
authorities and the probability for the appearance of non-Keynesian effects of public 
spending. The episodes of stronger discretionary tax changes have been characterized by 
non-Keynesian effects of budgetary purchases on output. Thus, the balanced budget 
achieved by a growing share of government spending and revenue in GDP impedes the 
year-to-year real economic growth. 
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What are the practical implications of the above results for Bulgaria’s fiscal 
policy once the country joins the EMU? According to the Stability and Growth Pact, the 
country has to keep the 3% deficit restriction and a budget “close to balance or in 
surplus” in the medium run. Due to the Currency Board Arrangement, introduced in 
1997, Bulgaria completely satisfies the criteria for the general government budget deficit 
as well as the debt-to-GDP ratio, imposed by the SGP8. This is a good starting position 
few years before entering the EMU. However, the government’s share in the economy is 
among the highest ones in CEEC. There is room for expenditure restrictions and a lower 
tax burden with a view to accelerating growth prospects. This should be accompanied by 
a reform in the public sector, specifically education, health care, public administration. 
The study suggests that although the balanced budget ensures a sustainability of 
the public finances, it could not guarantee a stimulating effect on output - the government 
size itself is a very important factor for the economic growth as well. So, the imposition 
of restrictions on the overall budget balance and the level of government debt alone is not 
enough; there should be regulations on the budgetary categories themselves. The SGP 
does not specify such rules. It does not assess how the country meets the balanced-budget 
criteria – by raising taxes and spending or by lowering both. 
The larger discretionary changes in the government spending/GDP ratios are more 
likely to lead to a non-Keynesian response of output. In light of this, following credible 
fiscal rules would be better than conducting discretionary policy actions in order to foster 
economic growth. One appropriate rule-based approach would be to keep the annual real 
                                                
8 Since 2002 the government debt has been constrained below 60% of GDP while the budgetary result has 
remained within the 3% reference value.  
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growth of cyclically adjusted current spending under the rate of real GDP growth. This 
means that their share in GDP would remain relatively stable thus allowing the automatic 
stabilizers to operate freely as well as to counteract the negative shocks to the economy.    
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